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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
October Term, 1918.

F. L. BYRON and
CHARLES S. AUSTIN,
Respondents,
vs.
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
A CORPORATION,

Appellant,
and
JOHN KNUDSON and
GEORGE C. EARL,

No. 3240

Defendants,
and
STEPHEN HAYS, Impleaded as
an additional defendant,
Respondent.
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Han. George F.
Goodwin, Judge.
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

COMPLAINT.

1

Filed March 31, 1916.
Plaintiffs complain of the defendants, and for
cause of action allege :

2:

1. That the defendant Utah Copper Company is now and at all of the times hereinafter
mentioned was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of New Jersey.
2. That the plaintiffs are now and at all of
the times hereinafter mentioned were the owners,
in the possession and entitled to the possession
and have the right to all ores in and underneath
the surface therein, in the property hereinafter
described, together with the right to mine and
remove the same.
3. That during the month of February, A. D.
1916, the defendants unlawfully and wrongfully
and without the consent of the plaintiffs, and
without any right whatever, forcibly entered upon
said premises hereinafter described, the property
of the said plaintiffs, and did tear, break down,
destroy, and remove certain chutes and other property which the plaintiffs had constructed upon
said premises for the purpose of removing said
ore aforesaid, and then and there ordered plaintiffs to desist from removing any ore from said
premises, and then and there stated and threatened
that they, the said defendants, would forcibly
eject and remove the plaintiffs, their agents, serv2 ants, and employees from said premises, if the
plaintiffs, or either of them, attempted to remove
or extract any ore from said premises, and then
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and there stated and threatened that they would
prevent the plaintiffs from placing or erecting any
chutes or anything else on said premises for the
purpose of removing said ore, and that they would
continue to eject and remove the plaintiffs if they
went upon said premises for the purpose of removing or extracting ore, and if necessary would render bodily harm to the plaintiffs, and to each of
them; and plaintiffs fear that the said defendants
will carry out said threats, unless restrained by
a judgment and order of this court, and that if
the defendants continue to harass and annoy the
plaintiffs, and destroy plaintiffs' property, and
prevent plaintiffs from removing said ore, they,
the said defendants will put plaintiffs to irreparable injury, and will put plaintiffs to the necessity of bringing a multiplicity of actions to protect their said rights.
4. Plaintiffs further allege that they have no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; that
said premises heretofore referred to are more
particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence in 5 degrees E.
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet,
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 749, thence S.
63 degrees 26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees
45 min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min.
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet,
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. 57.5 feet, thence N.

49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
W. along the southerly side line of said Lots 52 and
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 111 feet to
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E.
corner of said Lot 55, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees
30 min., 10 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 25
feet to the west side line of the west half of the east
half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence
south 0 degrees 5 min. along said side line 244
feet more or less to the place of beginning, containing 3.45 acres more or less.
3

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment
that the said defendants, their agents, servants,
and employees, be perpetually enjoined and restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs in
the building of such chutes or other structures
that may be necessary in the proper extraction
of said ore, and that they be restrained and
enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs in the
removal and extraction of said ores, and that
plaintiffs have such other and further relief as

5

may seem just and equitable, and for their costs
herein expended.
WILLARD HANSON,

Attorney for Plaintiffs.
(Verification.)

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE.

4

Filed March 3, 1916.
WHEREAS, in the above entitled cause it appears from the complaint of the plaintiffs on
file herein, supported by affidavit, that the plaintiffs ·are entitled to all the ore below and in the
surface of the premises hereinafter described, together with the right to remove and extract the
same, and
WHEREAS, it appears also from said complaint that said plaintiffs have erected and constructed ore chutes and other improvements necessary for the proper extraction and removal of said
ores, and
WHEREAS, it appears from the allegations
of said complaint that the defendants have broken
down and destroyed the said ore chutes and improvements, and have threatened to forcibly eject
and remove the said plaintiffs, their agents, servants, and employees, from the said premises, and
have ordered them not to go upon said premises to
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extract ore and remove the same therefrom, and
have threatened that if the said plaintiffs did go
upon said premises for the purpose of removinJ;:
and extracting ore, they, the said defendants, would
render bodily harm to the said plaintiffs, and
WHEREAS, plaintiffs pray that the said defendants be restrained and enjoined from tearing
down and removing the ore chutes and other improvements erected thereon by the plaintiffs, and
interfering with and preventing the plaintiffs from
going on said premises for the purpose of extract5 ing and removing the ore, and pray the court to
issue an injunction pending the hearing of the
cause upon its merits,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, that
the said defendants, their agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, be and they are hereby
restrained and forbidden from tearing down, removing, or destroying any ore chutes or other
improvements erected by the plaintiffs upon said
premises for the purpose of removing and extracting said ore, and are restrained and forbidden from
interfering with the plaintiffs from extracting and
removing the said ore, and are further restrained
and forbidden from preventing the plaintiffs' going
upon said premises for the purpose of removing
and extracting ores, and are restrained and forbidden from interfering with plaintiffs in any
manner whatsoever in the removal and extracting

7
of said ores, all of which the said defendants,
their agents, servants, employees, and attorneys
are forbidden and restrained from doing, until
the 17th day of March, A. D. 1916, and until
the further order of the court in the premises ;
and the said defendants are hereby required and
commanded to show cause before T. D. Lewis,
one of the Judges of this Court in the Court Room
thereof, in the City and County Building, at Salt
Lake City, Utah, at the hour of 2 o'clock P. M.
of the said last mentioned date, why this restraining order should not continue in force and effect
until the hearing of this cause upon its merits.
It is further ordered that the plaintiffs give
an undertaking in the sum of $500.00.
The premises described herein and affected by
this order are as follows:
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence in 5 degrees E.
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet,
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 749, thence S. 63
degrees 26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees
45 min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min.
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet,
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. 57.5 feet, thence N.
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence
6 S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
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W. along the southerly side line of said Lots 52 and
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 111 feet to
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E.
corner of said Lot 55, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E.- 8 feet, thence 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees
30 min., 10 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 25
feet to the west side line of the west half of the east
half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence
south 0 degrees 5 min. along said side line 244
feet more or less to the place of beginning, containing 3.45 acres more or less.
Dated March 3rd, 1916.
By the Court,
T. D.

LEWIS,

Judge.
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
(SEAL)

THOS. HOMER,

Clerk,

B. F.

QUINN,

Deputy Clerk.
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(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

AFFIDAVIT.

11

Filed March 8, 1916.
STATE OF UTAH,
}
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,

ss.

H. C. GOODRICH, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says that he is an officer of the defendant above-named, Utah Copper Company, towit, the chief engineer thereof; that as such chief
engineer this affiant is charged with the duty of
preserving and maintaining the property rights of
said defendant Utah Copper Company;
Affiant further states that heretofore and
on, to-wit, the lOth day of August, 1915, one
Stephen Hays and Mary A. Hays, his wife, were the
owners, in the possession and entitled to the possession of that certain tract of land situate in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, particularly described
as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. east 244 feet ; thence north 5 degrees east 306 feet; thence north 63 degrees 26
min. west 59 feet; thence north 23 degrees 7 min.
east 74.9 feet; thence south 63 degrees 26 min. east
27 feet; thence north 25 degrees 4 min. east 61.4
feet; thence south 63 degrees 26 min. east 21.5 feet;
thence north 29 degrees 45 min. east 162.5 feet;
12 thence north 2 degrees 45 min. W. 70 feet, thence
N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, thence S. 57
degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N. 49 de-
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grees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
170 f~t more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64 Smith Survey 101 feet to
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E.
corner of said Lot 65, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 30
min. E 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 25
feet to the west side line of the west half of the east
half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 2G; thence
south 0 degrees 5 min. west along said side line 244
feet more or less to the place. of beginning, containing 3.45 acres more or less.
That on said date the said Hays and wife for and
in consideration of the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) to them in hand paid by one
George C. Earl, did convey the said premises to
the said Earl, reserving, however, to themselves,
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to
all ores in and underneath the surface of said
above-described tract, together with the right to
mine and remove such ores; that thereafter and
on the same date the said George C. Earl and
Flora Earl, his wife, did convey the said premises
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unto the defendant above-named, Utah Copper
Company, and that the said defendant, Utah Copper Company, did thereupon enter into the possession of said premises so conveyed to it as aforesaid
and ever since said date has been in the possession
and entitled to the possession of said premises
and the whole thereof: and
This affiant further alleges that on, to-wit,
the 25th day of January, 1916, the said Stephen
Hays did execute and deliver to the plaintiffs
above-named, as this affiant is informed and believes and upon such information and belief states
13 the fact to be so, that certain lease wherein and
and whereby the said Hays did grant unto the said
plaintiffs the right to mine, extract and remove
any ore lying in and underneath the surface area
of the said premises so theretofore conveyed to
the said Earl and by the said Earl conveyed to
the defendant, Utah Copper Company, as aforesaid; that in and by the terms of said lease the
right of said plaintiffs to mine and extract any
ores and minerals in or underneath the surface
area of said premises was by the said Stephen
Hays granted, expressly subject to the terms and
conditions of the said deed of conveyance so
made by him to the said Earl as aforesaid:
and
This affiant further states that the said
plaintiffs, without the consent of the Utah Copper Company and against its will, entered upon
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the said surface area of the said property of
said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and are
now in the possession of and are disturbing the
said surface area and removing surface material
therefrom: and
This affiant further states that the said defendant, Utah Copper Company, the owner of
the said premises as aforesaid, is powerless to
prevent the said plaintiffs from trespassing upon
the said property of said defendant company
and disturbing and destroying the surface area
thereof, for that heretofore and on, to-wit, the
3rd day of March, 1916, in the above-entitled
cause this Honorable Court did improvidently and
without any hearing whatever, upon the complaint of the plaintiff herein and the affidavit
made in support thereof, enter its restraining
order restraining the said defendants herein and
each of them from in any way interfering with
the said plaintiffs in their unlawful trespass and
invasion of the surface area of the property of
the said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and
did in and by the terms of said order restrain
14 the said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and
its servants, agents and employees, from in any
way interfering with the said plaintiffs in their
unlawful and wrongful trespass upon the surface
area of the property of said defendant, Utah
Copper Company, and did likewise restrain the
said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and its
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servants and employees from in any way enjoying its said property, except subject to the unlawful trespass thereon by said plaintiffs: and
This affiant further states that since the
issuance of said restraining order the said plaintiffs have entered upon the surface area of tht>
said property of the said defendant, Utah Copper
Company, and have torn down and destroyed the
crib or bulk-head erected upon said property by
said defendants and have placed upon the sairl
surface area chutes and have been and still are
destroying the said surface area making cuts and
excavations thereon and in other ways trespassing
upon the property and estate of said defendant,
Utah Copper Company; and that said defendant
is as aforesaid, due to the improvident order of
this Honorable Court, prevented from in any
way resisting the said unlawful entry upon its
property by said plaintiffs and their trespass there~
on: and
This affiant further states that in order to
preserve the property of said defendant, Utah
Copper Company, and to prevent the destruction
thereof, the said plaintiffs should, pending the
trial of this cause, be prevented and restrained
from entering upon said surface area or interfering
therewith in any way whatever.
WHEREFORE AFFIANT PRAYS that this
Honorable Court do make an order enjoining and

14
restraining the said plaintiffs and each of them
from entering upon the surface area so owned by
said defendant, Utah Copper Company, as aforesaid, and that they and each of them be required
to refrain from entering upon said surface area
15 or in any way trespassing thereon, pending the
trial of this case and until the final determination
thereof.
H. C. GOODRICH.
(Verification.)
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, }

STATE

OF

UTAH,

ss.

I hereby certify that I received the within and
hereunto annexed order on the ninth day of March,
A. D. 1916, and that I personally served the same
upon the within named plaintiffs, to-wit, F. L.
Byron and Chas. S. Austin, by delivering to and
leaving with each a true copy of the within
and hereunto annexed order upon F. L. Byron,
at Bingham, Bingham Canyon, Salt Lake County,
Utah, and Chas. S. Austin, Highland Boy, Bingham
Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah, on the ninth day
of March, A. D. 1916.
I further certify that at the time of said
service I endorsed on the copy so served the date
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of service, signed my name thereto, and added
my official title.
Dated this Ninth Day of March, A. D. 1916.
JOHN S. CORLESS,
Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Utah.
By JOHN KNUDSEN,
Deputy Sheriff.
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

ORDER.
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Filed March 8, 1916.
Upon reading and filing the answer in the
above-entitled cause and the affidavit of H. C.
Goodrich, and it appearing therefrom to the satisfaction of the court that pending the trial
and the final determination of the above-entitled
cause, the said plaintiffs and each of them should
be enjoined and restrained from entering upon
the surface area of the property and premises
described in the affidavit of said H. C. Goodrich
and hereinafter described, and should be enjoined
and restrained from disturbing such surface area
or placing any chutes or other works thereon or
interfering therewith in any way whatever.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pending the final determination of
plaintiffs' order to show cause heretofore issued
and until the further hearing of the court, the
said plaintiffs and each of them, and each of
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their agents, servants and employees, be and
they are hereby enjoined and restrained from entering upon the surface area of the land and
premises hereinafter described or from disturbing
such surface area or placing any obstructions
thereon or interfering in any way whatever therewith the property and premises hereinafter particularly described as follows, to-wit:
18

Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees. E.
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet,
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9 feet, thence S. 63
degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet, thence N. 25 degrees 4 min. E. 61.4 feet, thence S. 63 degrees
26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45
min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min.
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet,
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N.
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of L<>t 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey, 101 feet to the
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E.
corner of said L<>t 55, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
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thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees
30 min., E. 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W.
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26;
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. west along said side
line 244 feet more or less to the place of beginning,
containing 3.45 acres more or less.
T. D. LEWIS,
(SEAL)
Judge.
Attest:
THOS. HOMER,

Clerk.
By:

B. F.

QUINN,

Deputy Clerk.
Done in open court this 8th day of March,
1916.

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

ORDER.
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Filed May 20, 1916.
The order to show cause heretofore and on
the 3rd day of March, A. D. 1916, issued herein
requiring said defendants to show cause why the
restraining order issued in connection with said
order to show cause should not continue in force
until the hearing and final determination of this
cause, and the additional restraining order issued
at the instance of said defendants on the 8th
day of March, A. D. 1916, restraining plaintiffs

18
pending the hearing and final determination of
plaintiff's order to show cause heretofore issued
in this cause and until the further order of
the court from committing the acts therein mentioned, having come on to be heard on the
17th day of March, A. D. 1916, Willard Hanson
and Charles C. Dey appearing for the plaintiffs,
and A. C. Ellis and Russell G. Schulder appearing
for the defendants, and the court having heard
the evidence adduced by the respective parties and
the arguments of counsel, and the court being
fully advised in the premises,
IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED that said
restraining orders, and each of them, heretofore
issued herein be, and the same are hereby, modified
as follows:
20
1. In respect to the so-called south ore dump,
situate near the southeast corner of the premises
bounded and described on plaintiff's Exhibit "4"
and more particularly described in said restraining order issued March 8, 1916, the plaintiffs
and their agents and employees are hereby permitted to enter upon, have access to and remove
the whole or any part or portion thereof which
contains ore of any economic or commercial value,
and provided that in removing the said ore the
said plaintiff shall not interfere with, remove,
or in any manner cut into the cribbing surrounding said south dump.

19
2. In respect to the so-called ore dump, situate in the northerly portion of the premises bounded and defined on plaintiffs' Exhibit "4" and
more particularly described in said restraining
order issued March 8, 1916, the plaintiffs and
their agents and employees are hereby permitted
to enter upon, have access to and remove any
part or portion of the ore or material of any
economic or commercial value contained in said
dump and lying northerly of a line or plane, said
line running from a point which is fifteen (15)
feet northerly from the northwest corner of the
wjall or fence designated on said E·xhibit "4"
by the letter "B," to a point in the cribbing supporting said northerly dump where the line of
the wall or fence designated upon said Exhibit
"4" by the letters "B-C" if produced in a northwesterly direction, would intersect said cribbing,
and lying northerly of a line drawn fifteen (15)
feet distant from and parallel to the wall or
fence designated upon said Exhibit "4" by the
letters "B-C."
3. In removing the portions of said dumps
and each of them valuable for the mineral therein
contained under the permission as hereinbefore
defined, the work is to be carried on in such
a manner as not to include or encroach upon the
original surface ground underneath the said dumps
and each of them ; also in such a manner as will

.20
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not interfere with or injure any of the improvements on the premises hereinbefore referred to,
provided that the cribbing supporting said northerly dump shall not be interfered with to a greater
extent than it has been in the past. The position
of said dump, lying southerly of the line or plane
described in paragraph 2 of this order shall not be
encroached upon, interfered with, or moved in any
way.
4. The said plaintiff shall furnish to said
defendant a true and correct statement of the
cost of removing the said ore and the coRt of
transportation, and shall likewise furnish to said
defendant the settlement sheets showing the smelting charges and proceeds.
5. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
restraining orders heretofore issued herein, and
each of them, as herein and hereby modified, shall
continue in force pending the final determination
of this action, or until the further order of the
court in the premises.
6. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a
condition upon which the said plaintiffs are given
the right to remove the said ore and material as
hereinabove specified, they shall execute an undertaking to be approved by the Judge of this Court
in the sum of five thousand dollars, and that
as a condition for a continuance of the restraining
order heretofore issued on behalf of the said
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defendant as hereinabove provided, that said defendant give an undertaking to be approved by
the Judge of this Court in the sum of five thousand dollars.
Dated this 20th day of May, A. D. 1916.
By the court:
MORRIS L. RITCHIE, Judge.
Attest:
THOS. HOMER, Clerk.
By B. F. QUINN,
Deputy Clerk.
(Seal).

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE.

22

Filed May 5, 1917.
Comes now Stephen Hays, impleaded as an
additional party defendant to the above entitled
cause, accepts service of the amended complaint
therein, acknowledges receipt of a copy thereof,
and hereby enters his appearance thereto, and
takes ten (10} days from the date hereof within
which to answer, or otherwise plead, to said amended complaint.
Dated this 4th day of May, A. D. 1917.
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,
Attorneys for Stephen Hays.

.22
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

AMENDED COMPLAINT.
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Filed May 5, 1917.
Come now the plaintiffs above named, and by
leave of court first had and obtained, file this their
amended complaint, and complaining of the defendants allege:
1. That the defendant, Utah Copper Company, is now and at all times hereinafter mentioned wa~ tt corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
New Jersey.

2. That on and prior to the lOth day of August, A. D. 1915, said defendant, Stephen Hays,
was the owner, in possession and entitled to the
possession of the following described property,
situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wit:
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Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees E.
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet,
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9, thence S. 63
degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet, thence N. 25 degrees
4 min. E. 61.4 feet, thence S. 63 degrees 26
min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45 min.
E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. W. 70
feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, thence
S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N.
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence

23
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 101 feet to the
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E.
corner of said lot 65, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees
30 min., E. 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W.
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26;.
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. west along said side
line 244 feet more or less to the place of beginning,
containing 3.45 acres more or less.
3.

That on said last mentioned date, said

defendant, Stephen Hays, together with his wife,
by quit claim deed conveyed said premises to the
defendant, George C. Earl; said grantors, however,
in said quit claim deed and conveyance, expressly
reserving to themselves, their heirs, successors and
assigns, the right to all ores in and underneath
the surface area of the property hereinabove in
paragraph 2 hereof described, together with the
right to mine and remove the same, provided said
mining operations of said grantors should not
endanger any building or buildings, or improvements then, or thereafter erected on a portion of
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the surface area of said property, by reason of sinking or caving of the surface of said area, caused
by said mining operation ; said portion of the
surface of said area being described as follows,
to-wit:
Beginning at a point which bears North 22
degrees 30 min E. 269 feet, from the Southwest
corner of the west half of the east half of the
Northwest quarter of said Section 26; thence N.
17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; thence South 72
degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; thence South 17 degrees 30 min. West, 236 feet; thence North 72
degrees 30 min. West, 100 feet to the beginning.
And said grantors also reserving the right to use
any wagon road which might be constructed in
25 the future by said grantees over said property described in paragraph 2.
4. That thereafter and on or about the 25th
day of January, A. D. 1916, said defendant, Stephen
Hays, by written mining lease, granted, demised
and let to the plaintiffs herein said property hereinabove, in paragraph 2 hereof, described, together
with other property; to have and to hold the same
unto the said plaintiffs for the term of two years
from said last mentioned date, expiring at noon
on the 25th day of January A. D. 1918, unless
sooner forfeited through the violation of any of
the covenants therein against the said lessees
reserved. And in consideration of said lease and
demise, the plaintiffs herein covenanted and agreed

with said defendant, Stephen Hays, among other
things, to commence work at once, mining said
leased property and to work the same in a good
and workmanlike manner, steadily and continuously from the date of said lease and that a failure
to work said premises with at least two persons
for twenty-five (25) days in each calendar month,
after the first month in which said lease was
made, might, at the option of said Stephen Hays,
be considered a violation of said covenant; also
to pay and deliver to said defendant, Stephen Hays,
as royalty, twenty per cent of the net value of
all ore extracted from said premises during the
life of said lease.
5. That in said lease it was expressly provided that the plaintiff should in all respects
abide by and conform to the restrictions upon
said mining, contained in said deed from the said
defendant, Stephen Hays and wife, to the defend~
ant, George C. Earl, and the reservations and
proviso contained in said deed as hereinabove set
forth, were expressly set out and referred to in
said lease, and it was further covenanted and
agreed in said lease that for breach of any covenant or stipulation therein, said defendant, Stephen
Hays, as lessor, might declare said lease at an end.
26

6. That during the month of February, A. D.
1916, the defendants, Utah Copper Company, John
Knudson and George C. Earl, unlawfully and
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wrongfully and without the consent of the plaintiffs, forcibly entered upon said premises hereinabove in paragraph 2 described, and upon the
portion thereof where the plaintiffs, under said
lease, were engaged in mining and removing the
ores in and underneath the surface of said property, and did tear, break down, destroy and remove
certain chutes and other property which the
plaintiffs had constructed upon said premises for
the purpose of removing said ore as aforesaid,
and for which ·purpose the plainfiffs were using
said chutes. And that said last named defendants,
did then and there order the plaintiffs to desist
from removing any ore from said premises and
claimed and still claim that said plaintiffs had
not and have not the right to remove all, or any,
of the ore from the property in paragraph 2 above
described, or from any part thereof.
That said last named defendants then stated
and threatened that they would forcibly eject and
remove the plaintiffs, their agents, servants and
employees, from said premises, if the plaintiffs or
either of them attempted to remove, or extract any
ore from said premises, and that said defendants
now claim the right to so eject and remove the
plaintiffs, their agents, servants and employees,
from said premises, if said plaintiffs or either of
them attempt to remove or extract any ore from
said premises.

7. That in said month of February, A. D.
1916, and after tearing down and removing said
chutes, as aforesaid, said last named defendants
stated and threatened that they would prevent the
plaintiffs from placing or erecting any chutes or
anything else on said premises for the purpose of
removing any of the ore in and underneath the
surface area of said property, and that said de27 fendants would continue to eject and remove the
plaintiffs if they went upon said premises for the
purpose of removing or extracting said ore, and
if necessary would render bodily harm to the
plaintiffs and each of them.
8. That plaintiffs are informed and believe
and therefore allege, that said defendants will carry
out said threats and will continue to harass and
annoy the plaintiffs, destroy planitiffs' property
and prevent the plaintiffs from mining said property in a good and workmanlike manner, or otherwise, and prevent the plaintiffs from removing
all, or any, of the ore from all and every part·
of the premises described in said lease as weli as
the premises described in paragraph 2 hereof,
and will prevent the plaintiffs from working said
property steadily and continuously during the term
of said lease, or otherwise, unless restrained by the
decree and order of this court, and will put plaintiffs to the necessity of bringing a multiplicity of
actions at law to protect their rights in the premises.

28
That unless said defendants are so restrained,
the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury and
will be prevented from carrying out the covenants
and conditions, on their part to be performed, under
the terms of said lease and will be subject to the
liabilities resulting from such failure, as in said
lease provided.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs
against the defendants:

pray

judgment

1. That it be adjudged and decreed that the
plaintiffs, during the life of said lease and until
the 25th day of January, 1918, have the right to
all ores in and underneath the surface area of the
property described in paragraph 2 hereof, together
with the right to mine and remove the same, provided the mining operations of said plaintiffs
shall not endanger any building or buildings or
improvements erected, or that may be erected, on
that portion of said surface area particularly de28 described in paragraph 3 hereof, by reason of sinking or caving of the surface of said portion of
said surface area caused by said mining operations and that as to all other portions of the surface of said property described in said lease and
paragraph 2 hereof, the plaintiffs are under no
obligation to avoid endangering any building, buildings or improvements that are now on said surface or that may hereafter be erected thereon.

2. That the defendants, Utah Copper Company, John Knudson and George C. Earl, and each
of them, and their agents, servants and employees,
be enjoined and restrained, during the term of said
lease from in any manner interfering with the
plaintiffs or either of them, in the building of
such chutes or other structures as may be necessary
or proper in the extraction of ore from said premises and all parts thereof, and from interfering
with the plaintiffs, or either of them, in the removal and extraction of said ore.
3. For such other and further relief as to
the court may seem just and for costs of suit.
WILLARD HANSON AND DEY,
HOPPAUGH & FABIAN,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
(Verification.)
Copy received and service accepted and we
hereby consent that the foregoing amended complaint may be filed, this 4th day of May A. D.
1917.
ELLIS, SCHULDER & LUCAS,

Attorneys for Defendants Utah Copper Co.,
John Knudson and George C. Earl.
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

ANSWER OF STEPHEN HAYS IMPLEADED
AS AN ADDITIONAL PARTY
DEFENDANT.
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Filed May 14, 1917.
Comes now Stephen Hays, impleaded as an
additional party defendant in the above entitled
action, and for an answer to the amended complaint filed therein admits and alleges as follows,
to-wit:
I.
This defendant admits each and every allegation contained in said amended complaint.

II.
For a further answer to said complaint this
defendant alleged upon information and belief
that the allegations contained in paragraphs six,
seven and eight of plaintiffs' amended complaint,
are true and by reason of the acts therein set
forth this defendant's lessees have been unlawfully,
wrongfully and forcibly prevented from mining
30 on said premises and removing the ore therefrom,
and that by reason thereof this defendant has
been deprived of the royalties upon said ores,
to-wit, twenty (20%) per cent of the net value
of all ore extracted from said premises during the
life of said lease; that there is a great demand in
the market for the ores contained in said described
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premises, and that the prices therefor are now
and have been for some time past much higher
than that usually paid for the kind of ores contained in said property, and the prices for said
ores are liable to fall; and that by reason of the
said unlawful and wrongful acts of the said defendants, the Utah Copper Company, John Knudson
and George C. Earl, this defendant will suffer
irreparable injury and will be prevented from
receiving the royalties to which he is lawfully
and justly entitled, and that unless the said
defendants above mentioned are restrained and
enjoined from interfering with the extraction of
said ores in said premises, this defendant will
suffer great and irreparable loss and injury, and
will be prevented from receiving the royalties upon
said ores as aforesaid.
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays judgmenJ
against the above mentioned defendants as prayed
for in the plaintiff's amended complaint.
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,
Attorneys for defendant Stephen Hays.
(Verification.)
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

ANSWER.
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Filed June 12, 1917.
Now comes the Utah Copper Company, a
corporation, and John Knudson and George C.
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Earl, the defendants above-named, and for answer
to the amended complaint of the plaintiffs on
file herein,

I.
Admit the allegations contained in paragraphs

nmbered 1, 2 and 3 of said amended complaint.
II.

Answering paragraph numbered 4 of said
amended complaint, these defendants deny each
and evey allegation therein contained; but these
defendants admit that the said impleaded defendant
Stephen Hays did on or about the 25th day of
January, 1916, make, execute and deliver to the
plaintiffs herein a certain so-called mining lease
33 and bond, a copy of which is hereto annexed,
marked Exhibit "A," and made a part of this
answer.

III.
Answering paragraph numbered 5 of said
amended complaint, these defendants allege that
all the terms, conditions and provisions contained
in the said lease are as set forth and contained
in the said Exhibit "A" hereto annexed and
marked Exhibit "A" as aforesaid, and not otherwise.

IV.
Answering paragraphs numbered 6, 7 and
8 of said amended complaint, these defendants

33

deny each and every allegation in each of said
paragraphs contained.

Further answering said complaint, these defendants deny each and every allegation therein
contained, not herein specifically admitted or
denied.
And for a further answer to said amended
complaint and by way of answer to the answer
of the impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, these
defendants allege that they are informed and believe and upon such information and belief allege
the fact to be that said plaintiffs have not now,
nor has either of them, any estate, title, or interest whatever in or to the said lease heretofore
given and granted to them by the said Stephen
Hays; but to the contrary thereof have sold, assigned, set over and delivered all of their estate,
right, title and interest of, in and to said lease, and
all rights growing out of and arising out of the
same, to one C. H. Thompson, who now claims to
be the owner of said lease and all rights thereunder.
34

And these defendants furthere allege that
they are informed and believe and upon such
information and belief allege the fact to be, that
the said impleaded defendant Stephen Hays is
not now and has not been for several months last
past the owner of any part or portion of any
ores or minerals contained underneath the sur-

34

face of the premises described in the complaint
herein as having been conveyed by the said Hays
to the said defendant George Earl, and is not
now and has not been for several months last
past the owner, in the possession, or entitled to
the possession of any part or portion of any
premises whatever heretofore at any time by
him leased to said plaintiffs herein; but to the
contrary thereof, has sold, and conveyed said
premises and all of his estate, right, title and
interest therein or thereto unto the Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, a corporation.
And these defendants allege that by reason of
the premises, neither the plaintiffs, or either of
them, nor the said impleaded defendant Stephen
Hays, are the real parties in interest in this action
and that they have no right to maintain or prosecute this action.
And for answer to the alleged answer of th~,
impleaded defendant Stephen Hays, these defend··
ants deny each and every affirmative allegation
in said answer contained, except as to such allegations which are hereinbefore in this answer expressly admitted.
And these defendants specifically deny each
and every allegation of said answer contained in
paragraph numbered 2 thereof.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered, these
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defendants pray to be hence dismissed with their
costs of suit in this behalf incurred.
ELLIS, SCHULDER & LUCAS,
Attorneys for Defendants.
35
(Verification.)

EXHIBIT "A."
MINING LEASE AND BOND.
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THIS INDENTURE, made the 25th day of
January, 1916, between S. Hays of Salt Lake City,
Utah, Lessor, and F. L. Byron and Charles Austin,
both of Bingham, Lessee,
WITNESSETH
That the said Lessor for and in consideration
of the royalties, covenants and agreements hereinafter reserved and by the said Lessee to be paid,
kept and performed, and ha. . granted, demised and
let unto the said Lessee all the following described
mine. . . and mining property, situated in West
Mountain Mining District, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, described as
A parcel of land between Main Bingham Canyon and Carr Fork and extending from City Water
Tank to Meyers (or Mayers) hotel. In mining
on said land said lessees shall not endanger any
building on said land or improvements thereon
and shall in all respects abide by and conform
to the restrictions upon said mining contained
in deed recorded on page 327, Book 7-F of Deeds,
Records of Salt Lake County,
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together with the appurtenances; to have and to
hold unto the said Lessee for the term of two
years from the date hereof, expiring at noon of
the 25th day of January, 1918, unless sooner
forfeited through the violation of any covenant
hereinafter against the said Lessee reserved.
AND IN CONSIDERATION of the said demise
the said Lessee do. . covenant and agree with the
said Lessor. . as follows, to-wit:
FIRST-To commence work at once upon said
mine, and work the same in a good and workmanlike manner, working the aforesaid premises steadily and continuously from the date hereof; and
37 that a failure to work said premises with at
least 2 person. . for 25 days in each calendar
month, after the first month in which indenture
is made, may at the option of Lessor. . be considered a violation of this covenant.
SECOND-To timber said mine, when and
w}lere necessary, at Lessee's own expense.
THIRD-To allow the said Lessor .. or ...... .
agent .. to enter upon and into all parts of said mine
for the purpose of inspection.
FOURTH-To not assign this Lease, or any interest thereunder, or sublet the same, or any part
thereof, without the written consent of said Lessor ...
FIFTH-To pay and deliver to said Lessor ..
or to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agent. . , as royalty,
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twenty per cent of the net value of all ore extracted from said premises during the life of this
Lease. Net value means after the costs of transportation from mine to smelter or · sampler, and
sampling and assaying charges have first been
deducted, then the royalty as aforesaid to be paid
to Lessor. . or his agent.
SIXTH-To deliver up to said Lessor. . the
said premises with the appurtenances, and all
improvements, including in good order and con38 dition, without demand or further notice, on said
25th day of January, 1918, at noon, or at any
time previous, upon demand for forfeiture.
Said deed recorded on page 327 of Book F-7 of
Deeds, in office of County Recorder, Salt Lake
County, Utah, and herein referred to, contains
the following restriction:
Page 327, Book B of Deeds 1915, Aug. 10.
Said grantors reserve to themselves, their
heirs, successors and assigns, the right to all ores
in and underneath the surface area hereinbefore
described, together with the right to mine and
remove same; provided, said mining operation of
said grantors shall not endanger buildings or
buildings or improvements now or hereafter erected
on a portion of the surface area hereinabove described, by reason of the sinking or caving ir. of
the surface area caused by said mining operations.
Said portion being described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 de.
grees 30 min. E. 269 feet from S. W. corner of the:
Wlf2 of Elf2 of N. W. 1,4 of said Section 26;
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Thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet;
thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; thence
S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence N. 72
degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to beginning.
Also reserves the right to the use of any
w:agon road which may be constructed over the
ground conveyed 10 day of August, 1915.
GEo. E. EARL.
39
Each and every clause and covenant of this
indenture shall extend to the assigns, heirs, executors and administrators of all parties hereto.
For breach of any covenant or stipulation herein said lessor may declare this lease at an end.
Lessees may use any and all roads on land.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties,
Lessor. . and Lessee .. , have hereunto set their
hands and seals, in duplicate, the day and year
aforesaid.
(Signed)
(SEAL)
S. HAYS.
(Signed)
F. L. BYRON,
(SEAL)
(SEAL)
(Signed)
CHAS. S. AUSTIN.
Signed in the presence of
(Signed) A. S. WILLETT.

[TITLE OF CoURT AND CAUSE.]
DECISION.

40

Filed Sept. 5, 1917.
There is practically but one question involved
in this action; i. e., the rights of the respective
parties, dependent on the meaning of the following language in the deed, and which was incor-
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porated in the lease. Stephen Hays impleaded on
August lOth, 1915; he then being the owner,
executed a quit claim deed to George Earl to an
irregular tract, lying near the forks, and between
the main canyon, on one side, and Carr Fork,
on the other. Earl was acting for the defendant,
Utah Copper Company, and on the same day sold
the property to said company. The deed from
Hays to Earl granted the fee and contained thr
following reservation; "The grantor reserves all
the ores in and underneath the surface area, together with the right to mine and remove the
same." Then follows a proviso that in mining and
removing the ores, the grantors should not endanger any buildings or improvements thereon,
or that should thereafter be erected on, a certain
portion of said land, which was also described by
metes and bounds, and was rectangular in form.
Defendant, Utah Copper Company, entered into
the possession, and commenced the erection of some
residences on the portion referred to in the proviso; three houses were constructed within the
41 said rectangle, one partly within and partly without,
and one entirely without, towards the northerly
end, and a concrete retaining wall built partly within, and partly without. The tract embraced in
the proviso, was referred to during the trial, as
the restricted area, and for convenience will be
hereafter referred to under the letters R. A., which
means either restricted area, or rectangular area.
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January 25th, 1916, Hays leased the entire
tract to the plaintiffs, Byron and Austin, for a
term of two years; the lease was conditioned that
the lessees, in mining and removing the ore, should
not endanger any buildings or improvements then
on the entire tract described in the deed to Earl.
The lease also copied the proviso in the deed with
reference to the R. A.
As I recall the testimony, it is left doubtful
whether the north house, beyond the R. A. was
constructed at the date of the lease.
Some
time after the execution of the lease, another residence known as the "Schilling" house was constructed off the R. A., to the south. Counsel for
the respective parties practically agreed that the
word "ores," as used in the deeds and lease, meant
mineral of a commercial value; considerable oral
evidence was introduced tending to prove the existence of pay ores near, and in some instances,
outcropping, at the surface. Testimony was also
given, over the objection of the defendant, that
pay ores were mined there by one Hoster, under
a lease from Hays, in 1907, portions of it being
mined by caving the surface, the evidence also
shows that at the date of the deed and lease, the
defendant, Utah Copper Company, was extensively
engaged in surface mining, or quarrying, in the
immediate vicinity of the ground in question; that
such method was the most practical and economical,
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and the only method by which low grade copper
ores could be mined and smelted at a profit. The
conversations that occurred between Hays and Earl,
before the execution of the deed, were also allowed
to be given in evidence, not for the purpose of
varying, or contradicting, the terms of the deed,
but to put the court, as far as possible, in the
situation of the parties, at the time the deed was
executed. For the purposes of this decision, Hays,
who was impleaded as a defendant, at the request
of the plaintiffs, the lessees, will be referred to as
a plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiffs contend that
the language contained in the reservation, "in and
underneath the surface," comprehends all commercial ores contained in the fee granted, and
that the grantor and his lessees had the rtght
to mine and remove the same, provided they did
not endanger any buildings or improvements on
the R. A. They also claim the ownership of the
ore (if any) removed in excavating for the foundation of the houses, and placed in the two dumps,
and the right to remove and dispose of the same,
and to cut the cribbing supporting the dumps, if
necessary, in order to effect such removal. They
further contend that they have the right to mine
and dispose of the ore, outside of the R. A., even
though by so doing, the houses, constructed outside
of the R. A., should be injured or destroyed. Counsel for defendants contend that the language of
the reservation means, all ores within the exterior
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boundaries of the tract conveyed, and underneath
the "surface," rejecting the word "area" in that
construction, as meaningless; they also contend that
having title to the fee, the defendants have the
right to construct houses outside of the R. A.,
and to have sub-jacent support for the same, and
that in removing the ores plaintiffs have no right
to injure or destroy such houses, or sub-jacent
support for the same; they also deny the ownership
43 by the plaintiffs of the ores in the dumps and
specifically the right to cut the cribbing in order
to remove the same, from the north dump, because
it would injure that part of the concrete retaining
wall, which was constructed outside the R. A.
Extensive briefs have been filed on both sides,
and many cases cited to explain the meaning of
the language of the deed, and lease, both as to
the ores reserved, and as to the right to mine and
remove the same. In practically all these cases the
rights of the grantor, where the fee was granted
and the mineral reserved, or the mineral was granted
and the fee reserved, were determined with reference to the common understanding, and practice
with reference thereto.
The correct solution of the questions involved,
is not so simple a matter as appears from a casual
reading of the deed, and is one upon which men
learned in the law might honestly differ. The decision is important to the plaintiffs, Hays and his
lessees, by reason of the value of the ores, and to
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the defendant, Utah Copper Company, by reason of
the value of the houses, and other improvements
already constructed, and the right it claims to construct other houses, or make such other use of the
surface as it may, in future desire. The court has
given considerable time and study to the questions,
and examined most of the text books and authorities
cited. Counsel for the respective parties practically
agree upon the general principles and rules applicable to the construction of the deed and lease. Plaintiffs' counsel, at page 4 of their brief, state them
in the following language: "In construing private
conveyances, it is apparent that each case must
be decided upon the language of the grant, or
reservation, the surrounding circumstances, and
the intention of the grantor, if it can be ascer44 tained." And counsel for defendants, at page 7
of their brief, state them as follows: "1. The
object in construing a deed is to ascertain the
intention of the parties.
"2. And to that end, the instrument must be
construed according to the mind and intent of
the parties, at the time it was executed, and
accordingly, all the material circumstances known
to the parties, are to be taken into consideration
by the court, in construing doubtful expressions
in a deed."
In determining the meaning of the written
contract, the primary factor, as stated by defendant's counsel, is, "to ascertain the intention of
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the parties." To ascertain that intention, recourse
must be had to the whole instrument, and proper
effect given to every word, phrase and sentence.
The court should also be placed, as far as possible,
in the situation of the parties, at the time of the
execution of the deed. Counsel for defendant, in
their brief, state their contention as follows:
"Clearly the ore in contemplation of the parties,
was the mineral in situ, underlying the surface,
and to be found beneath the bed rock. The parties
clearly had reference to the ore as found in the
metalifferous rock in place, distinct from the surface debris, slide, alluvium or wash." In my
opinion, to interpret the language of the reservation, as contended for by defendant's counsel,
requires a strained and unnatural meaning to be
given to the language used. To my mind, the
plain and ordinary meaning is that the grantor
"reserved all the ores." To obtain the meaning
claimed by defendant's counsel, it is necessary to
either read into the instrument other, and additional words, not used, or to transpose the words
used, and eliminate a part that were used. To
construe the reservation, as claimed by counsel
for defendant, is to disregard the word "in"
entirely. Counsel argued that it means the "ores
in the area hereinbefore described and underneath
the surface." To express this intention, it was
wholly unnecessary to use the words "in," and
45 "and." If the language used had been "reserves
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the right to all ores underneath the surface hereinbefore described," that would have conveyed the
meaning claimed by defendant. I think the plain
meaning is, all the ores "in" the surface, and
"underneath" the surface. The meaning of this
clause becomes important, taken in connection with
the "right to mine and remove the same," i. e.,
all the ores, both in and underneath the surface,
in determining the question of a waiver of the
right to sub-jacent support, hereinafter discussed.
Again, as was suggested by the court during the
oral argument, it would seem to be wholly unnecessary to reserve the ores contained within
the exterior boundaries, for the reason that the
grantor, of course, could not reserve ores that
were without the exterior boundaries. In answer
to that suggestion, counsel for defendant suggests
that there might possibly be a. vein apexing within
such boundaries. If that were true, the effect
of the meaning contended for by defendant, would
be to prevent the grantor from following such
vein on its dip, outside the exterior boundaries,
which the grantor would not be likely to have
intended.
Another fact that militates against the claim
of the defendant, is that the ores, whatever may
be their value, outcropped in places at the surface,
and the parties must be held to have contracted
with reference to that fact. In arriving at the
intention of the parties, it is necessary to consider
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the methods of mining in the district, and in the
immediate vicinity of the property in question.
The language used in this deed would not mean
the same under all circumstances and conditions.
The world moves; conditions change; new discoveries spell progress; new inventions mean new,
and different methods. The law of common carriers, as applied to stage coach and canal boat,
would not fit, or apply to steam and electric
railroads, nor ocean liners. The language used
46 in this deed, if the deed were executed in a
mining district where all mining was carried on
underground, might well be held to mean that in
mining and removing the ores, neither the actual
surface, nor the sub-jacent support, should be
disturbed. But such language used in a district
where, for many years, surface mining for low
grade copper ores had been constantly in use
by miners generally, and on this particular tract,
by plaintiffs, and was the method first inaugurated and carried to success by defendant corporation, and in actual operation at the date of the
deed, by defendant, and the further fact, which
is practically conceded, and certainly demonstrated
by the evidence, that such method is more practical, more economical, and in fact the only method
by which the mining of ore, such as is shown to
exist in the ground in question, can be successfully carried on, must be held to mean that the
parties to the deed in question, understood that
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such method was to be used by the grantor, or
his successor in interest. If we look at the conversations between Hays and Earl, as testified
to by both, it seems clear that such was in fact
their understanding.
This brings us to consider the doctrine of subjacent support, so earnestly contended for by
defendant's counsel. The doctrine had its origin
in England, and in the early decisions it was
held, that in all grants or reservations of ores
or minerals, there was a presumption of sub-jacent
support. This general doctrine has been followed generally by the courts of this country;
even the case of Griffin vs. Fairmount Coal Company, relied on by plaintiffs' counsel, concedes it,
but the majority opinion holds that it was waived
by the language of the grant. It is there in effect
held that there is no such presumption, and that
each grant, or reservation, should be construed,
like any other contract, according to the intention
of the parties, as disclosed by the language used.
It is unnecessary to discuss this doctrine at length,
47 for the reason that counsel for the plaintiffs
concede the principle, but deny its application in
this case. It is also held by the weight of
authority, both in England and in this country,
that this right may be waived, either expressly,
or by implication. As said in Gordon vs. Delaware,
etc., R. Co. (Pa.), 97 Atlantic 1032; "Right of
surface support can be waived by an implied, as
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well as an express covenant, and it is so implied
by the acceptance of a grant offered upon terms
unmistakably intended to extinguish the right."
"It follows, therefore, that where the terms of the
instrument by which the severance of the two
estates was effected, are shown, the general doctrine of implied right to sub-jacent support, does
not alone determine the right of the parties; but
the question arises whether or not the right of support has been released or waived by the instrument
under consideration, and in determining this question, the general rule is, that the right will be
held waived only by express, or apt words, in the
conveyance, or by the clearest implication. Such
seems to be the rule in Pennsylvania, where the
subject of surface support has received more consideration than in any other states." (Sherwin,
Justice, in Collins vs. Gleason Co., 115 N. W. 497.)
Was it waived in this case? Adverting to the
second rule stated by counsel for the defendant,
at page 7 of their brief, "and to that end the
instrument must be construed according to the
mind and intent of the parties at the time it was
executed, and accordingly, all the material circumstances known to the parties are to be taken into
consideration by the court, in construing doubtful
expressions in a deed." One of the important and
material circumstances to be construed, is the
method of mining in common use at the date of
the deed, in the vicinity of the property in ques-
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tion. In many, and probably most of the cases
cited, the particular manner or method of mining
ores is specified in the grant or reservation. Here,
48 no method is mentioned. It must, therefore,
follow, under the rule above quoted, that the
method or manner in common use in that vicinity
must have been intended, and was, in law, in
contemplation of the parties to the deed. That
method, as to this class of low grade copper ores,
was by mining (caving and sinking) from the
surface. The right to mine and remove the ore
in the surface, and the right to sub-jacent support,
cannot both exist at the same time; the one is
destructive of the other. I think the proper construction of the deed is that the grantee obtained
a title in fee to all the described area; and the
grantor reserving title to all the ores; that as to
the R. A., the grantee obtained the absolute protection from danger by the mining operations of
the grantor, or his lessees; and as to the balance
outside the R. A., the grantee obtained the fee
in such condition as it should be left in by the necessary operations of the grantor, or his lessees,
in mmmg and removing the ores, "in and underneath the surface," by the usual and ordinary
methods in vogue in that vicinity. Counsel for
defendant, however, argues that the proviso refers
only to damage by "caving or sinking." But if
the grantor had no right to damage the surface,
in any manner, or at all, the greater would in-
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elude the less, and the grantee would obtain no
additional protection by the language of the proviso, and it would be practically meaningless.
The question then is, does the reservation of
the right to mine and remove the ore in the surface,
and the proviso with reference to the R. A., in
effect amount to a waiver of the right to subjacent support of the surface as to the area outside
of the R. A., which, as a general rule, obtains in all
grants or reservations of minerals? Under the
facts and circumstances of this case, I think it
does. It seems to me that the proviso is a
limitation defining the extent of the right to which
sub-jacent support should be applied. As to the
49 R. A., the grantor guaranteed to so mine and
remove the ore, as not to endanger the buildings
or improvements then, or thereafter, to be constructed thereon. If the contention of counsel
for the defendant should prevail, then the proviso
gives defendant no additional right, and should
be rejected, which violates one of the principal
tenets of construction. But treating the proviso
as defining and limiting the right of sub-jacent
support, gives it proper meaning and effect, and
harmonizes with the purposes and intention of
the parties, as disclosed by the conversations that
took place before the execution of the deed. .tlays
testified that he was familiar with the ground
ever since he had been in Bingham; that ore was
exposed in pretty nearly all the ground, and
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cropped out at, and above the surface; that Hostel
did surface mining. Earl testified: "We had
been trying to find place to construct houses on
this ground, if we could get proper provisions;
when I went to see Hays, I had a blue print showing the contour of the ground in controversy. I
first put the proposition up to him (Hays) that
we wanted to buy all the title; he said he would sell
the surface. He wanted to reserve some ground
on the Bingham Canyon side, from which he
might work the property. He mentioned two kinds
of ore; he said Hoster had taken out valuablt>
sulphide ore, and said 'some day I expect to have
a mine.' He also mentioned lead ores; he asked
me why we wanted so much ground, and I told
him we might want to put up a number of build·
ings. He said he wanted to reserve the righ: to
mine the ground; he would guarantee to keep
support on a portion of the ground; at the second
conversation, at his request, we outlined on the
blue print the R. A., and I told him that was the
place we wanted to construct our first buildings.
The understanding was that Hays would have the
right to mine the surface, so long as it did not
endanger the buildings or improvements on the
R. A."
50

Placing this construction upon the language
of the reservation and proviso, necessarily requires
a determination of the further question, is the
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reservation so repugnant to the grant of the fee,
as to render it void? I think not.
Of course it follows from these views, that
the ores, if any, removed in constructing the houses
on the R. A., belong to plaintiffs, and that the
defendant is not entitled to the support of the
north dump, for the support of the concrete wall
that was constructed off the R. A., and the plaintiffs are entitled to remove the ores, if any, in
both dumps, by cutting the cribbing, so far as
actually necessary, for that purpose. In mining
and removing the ores, in accordance with this
decision, plaintiffs, of course, must not wantonly,
or unnecessarily injure or destroy the buildings
or improvements placed on the ground by the defendant. It follows that where the defendant, acting under a mistaken view of the law, has erected
buildings, or made improvements, outside the R. A.,
such fact cannot prevent the plaintiffs from mining and removing the ore, according to the right
reserved in the deed. The lessees having contracted not to injure or destroy any buildings or
improvements then (at the date of the lease) on
any portion of the entire tract, the defendant, Utah
Copper, can avail itself of that provision, as
against the lessees with reference to any houses
constructed outside the R. A., at the date of the
execution of the lease.
Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunc-
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tion, in harmony with this decision, and the findings and decree may be prepared accordingly.
Sept. 4, 1917.
GEO. F. GOODWIN, Judge.
Attest:
THOS. HOMER, Clerk.
By J. P. FANNING, Deputy Clerk.
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]
NOTICE.
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Filed Nov. 9, 1917.
To the defendants above named, and to Messrs.
Ellis & Lucas, their attorneys:
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE
TAKE NOTICE, that on Monday, the 8th day of
October, A. D. 1917, at the hour of 10 o'clock
a. m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel
can be heard, the plaintiffs herein and the impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, will present to
his Honor, Judge Geo. F. Goodwin, one of the
judges of the above entitled court for settlement
and signing, their proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and decree herein, copy of
which is herewith served upon you.
WILLARD HANSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,
Attorneys for Stephen Hays,
Impleaded Defendant.
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Copy of the above notice, together with a copy
of the hereunto attached findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree, received, and service
thereof accepted this 5th day of October, 1917,
at the hour of 3:45 o'clock p. m.
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,

Attorneys for Defendants.

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW.
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This cause being at issue upon the amended
complaint of the plaintiffs herein, also the answer
of the impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, joining
with the plaintiffs in said action against the other
defendants, and the answer of the defendants, Utah
Copper Company, John Knudson and George C. Earl,
to the amended complaint of the plaintiffs herein,
and to the answer of the impleaded defendant,
Stephen Hays, and having come on regularly for
trial before said court, on the 28th day of June,
1917; the plaintiffs appearing by Willard Hanson,
Esq., their attorney, and the impleaded defendant
Stephen Hays appearing by Messrs. Booth, Lee,
Badger & Rich, his attorneys, and the defendants,
Utah Copper Company, John Knudson and George
C. Earl, appearing by Messrs. Ellis & Lucas, their
attorneys, and the court having heard the evidence
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adduced by the respective parties, and the argument
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
53 does now make and file its findings of fact
and conclusions of law herein, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT.

1. That on the lOth day of August, 1915, the
defendant Stephen Hays was, and for a long time
prior thereto had been, the owner, in possession
and entitled to the possession of the property
situate in the West Mountain Mining District,
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, consisting of
approximately 3.45 acres, described as follows,
to wit:
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees E.
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet,
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9 feet, thence
S. 63 degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet, thence N. 25 degrees 4 min. E. 61.4 feet, thence S. 63 degrees
26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45
min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min.
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet,
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N.
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
W. along the southerly side line of said Lots 62
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
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thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 101 feet to the
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E .. hi feet to the S. E.
corner of said Lot 65, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plat "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees
30 min. E 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W.
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26 ;
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. W. along said line 244
feet more or less to the place of beginning, containing 3.45 acres more or less.
2. That on said lOth day of August, 1915,
said defendant Stephen Hays, together with his
wife, by quit-claim deed conveyed to the defendant
George C. Earl said property and premises above
described, subject to the following reservations
and provisions: That in and by said deed of conveyance said grantors expressly reserved to themselves, their heirs and assigns, the right to all
54 ores in and underneath the surface area of
the property so conveyed, together with the right
to mine and remove the same, with the proviso that
the mining operations should not endanger any
building or buildings or improvements then or
thereafter erected on the following described portion of the surface area of said property so conveyed, by reason of sinking or caving of the surface of said area caused by such mining operations,
to wit:
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Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 degrees
30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. corner of the
West half of the East half of the N. W. quarter of
said Section 26; thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236
feet; thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet;
thence S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence
N. 72 degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to the place of
beginning.
That said grantors in and by said deed also reserved the right to use any wagon road which
might be constructed in the future by said grantee
over said property so conveyed.
3. That the grantee in said deed, the defendant George C. Earl, in obtaining and taking
said deed was acting as the agent for and on
behalf of the defendant Utah Copper Company, and
thereafter and on said lOth day of August, 1915,
conveyed said property to the defendant Utah
Copper Company.
4. That at the time of the conveyance by the
defendant Stephen Hays to the defendant George
C. Earl, and for a long time prior thereto the said
premises conveyed as aforesaid were known to b~>.
valuable for the ores and metals therein contained, and particularly for copper ore; also known
that ore of marketable and economic value had
been found and was contained at many places in
said premises so conveyed at and immediately
underneath the surface area thereof; also known
that mining operations had theretofore been carried on in said premises by employing surface.
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as well as underground, methods of mmmg; also
known at the time said deed was made, that in
the vicinity of said premises so conveyed the
55 methods generally adopted for mining low grade
copper ore were by taking out and removing all the
material from the surface downward and shipping
whatever thereof would justify shipping for the
mineral contents therein contained. That said
surface process of mining ore was, at the time of
the making of said deed, carried on successfully
by the defendant Utah Copper Company at its
mine in said mining district in close proximity
to the premises conveyed by the defendant Stephen
Hays to the defendant George C. Earl. That said
surface method of mining was and is the practical
and more economic method, and the only method
by which the mining of ores such as exist at or
immediately underneath the surface of the ground
conveyed by Stephen Hays to George C. Earl can
be successfully and profitably carried on.
5. That at the time said defendant Stephen
Hays conveyed said premises to the defendant
George C. Earl, it was the intention of the parties
to said deed in respect to said reservation therein
contained, that by said reservation the grantee
therein, the defendant George C. Earl, thereby relinquished and waived any right whatsoever to
sub-jacent support of the surface of said premises
so conveyed in respect to any mining operations
thereafter carried on by the grantor, said defend-
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ant Stephen Hays, his heirs and assigns, except
only in respect to said portion thereof, being said
rectangular strip of ground 236 feet in length by
100 feet in width hereinbefore described, and included within the area conveyed as aforesaid.
6. That after the making of said conveyances,
the defendant Utah Copper Company, excavated
said rectangular strip aforesaid for the purpose
of erecting buildings thereon and removed the material so excavated to other portions of said premises so conveyed, making two dumps and supported
the same in part by cribbing, and used a portion
of one dump to support a retaining wall constructed
by it. That the quantity of material so removed
W'.as very great. That said material had economic
56 and commercial value for the minerals therein
contained, particularly copper. That when said
rectangular strip had been excavated, the defendant, Utah Copper Company, erected thereon a retaining wall and constructed five substantial houses
in a row, three of them being situate wholly within the boundaries of said rectangular strip, one
partly within and partly without said strip, and one
entirely off of said strip, and also continued said
retaining wall on said premises so conveyed beyond
the boundaries of said rectangular strip or building
area.
7. That after said rectangular strip had been
excavated and built upon by the defendant Utah
Copper Company, and on the 25th day of January,
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1916, the defendant Stephen Hays, by an instrument in writing, granted, demised and let to the
plaintiffs herein for a term of two years from
said date, that certain mine and mining property,
including all the premises, conveyed by the said
Stephen Hays to the said George C. Earl, upon
the condition that in mining said premises the
said lessees should not endanger any buildings on
said premises or improvements thereon, and should
in all respects abide by and conform to the restrictions upon said mine contained in said deed
from said Stephen Hays to said George C. Earl.
That in and by said lease said leasers, the plaintiffs herein, agreed among other things, to commence work upon said mine, working the aforesaid premises steadily and continuously from the
date of said lease, and to pay and deliver to said
defendant Stephen Hays, lessor, as royalty twenty
per cent of the net value of all ores extracted from
said premises during the life of said lease.
8. That immediately after the making and
execution of said lease, the plaintiffs herein prepared for and undertook to carry on the business of
mining in and underneath the surface of said
demised premises, except only as to the portion
thereof referred to herein as the rectangular strip
or building area, and the other portions thereof
upon which buildings had been erected at the time
of the making of said lease. That in so doing
they attempted to first remove, ship and sell the

.61

ore contained in the material which had been removed by the defendant Utah Copper Company
from said rectangular strip or building area and
deposited in dumps or other portions of said
premises. That the dumps were supported by
cribbing erected by the defendant Utah Copper
Company. That it became necessary for plaintiffs
to disturb such cribbing sufficiently to enable them
to economically and properly remove the ore contained in said dumps. That while plaintiffs were
so engaged and during the month of February,
1916, the defendants Utah Copper Company, John
Knudson and George C. Earl, without the consent
of the plaintiffs, wrongfully broke down, destroyed
and removed chutes and other property which the
plaintiffs had constructed for the purpose of facilitating the mining operations to be carried on at
said demised premises, and refused to permit the
plaintiffs to remove any of the ore from said demised premises or to disturb said cribbing, or to
carry on any mining operations on said premises,
and asserted and claimed that the plaintiffs had
no right to mine or remove any ore from said
premises or any part thereof, or from said dumps.
9. That after the making of said lease to the
plaintiffs and after the commencement of this
action, the defendant Utah Copper Company erected,
off of and to the south of said rectangular strip or
building area and upon the premises included in
said deed to said defendant George C. Earl and in
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said lease to said plaintiffs, a large and expensive
building. That in close proximity to the surface
area immediately underneath said building so
erected there was and is ore and mineral in large
quantities and of commercial value which could be
mined and shipped at a profit.
10. That since the commencement of this ac58 tion, and during the pendency thereof, the plaintiffs herein have respectively sold, transferred and
assigned their interest in said lease, and the same
is now held by Earl Randall, Trustee in trust for
J. W. Rooklidge, C. H. Thompson, D. A. Bunker
and himself, who are now the legal and equitable owners of said lease.
11. That the impleaded defendant, Stephen
Hays, is now and ever since prior to the making
of said deed and of said lease has been, the owner
of all the ores and minerals in and underneath the
surface area of the property and premises conveyed
by him to the defendant George C. Earl, and has
not sold nor conveyed his said estate, right, title
or interest therein or thereto, or otherwise disposed of the same, except under said lease to the
plaintiffs herein.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

1. That the impleaded defendant Stephen
Hays is the owner of all the ores in and underneath the surface area of the property described
in the findings of fact herein, conveyed by him
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to the defendant George C. Earl, and by said
George C. Earl conveyed to the defendant Utah
Copper Company, together with the right to mine
and remove all the ores therefrom, providing that
the mining operations shall not endanger any building or buildings or improvements erected or to be
erected on the portion of the surface area of said
property so conveyed, being the rectangular strip
236 feet in length by 100 feet in width described
in the findings of fact herein; and provided further,
that in carrying on said mining operations, neither
plaintiffs nor said Stephen Hays, shall wantonly
or unnecessarily injure or damage any buildings or
improvements erected on said premises by the defendant, Utah Copper Company.

59

2. That in and by the reservation contained
in said deed of conveyance from the defendant
Stephen Hays to the defendant George C. Earl of
the premises described in the findings of fact
herein, and with respect to and concerning the
mining and removing by the grantor, said defendant Stephen Hays, his heirs and assigns, of any
and all ores in and underneath the surface area
of said property so conveyed, except only as to a
portion thereof, to wit, the rectangular strip 236
feet in length by 100 feet in width described in
the findings of fact, the said grantee, the defendant
George C. Earl, waived or released and surrender~d
all right to surface and sub-jacent support of the

64
ground so conveyed to him in its natural state, or
otherwise.
3. That during the continuance of the lease
referred to in the findings of fact herein, the
plaintiffs herein, and their successors in interest
under said lease, have the right (except as hereinafter qualified) to mine and remove any and all
ores in and underneath the surface area of the property conveyed by said defendant Stephen Hays to
said defendant George C. Earl and described in the
findings of fact herein, including all the dumps
thereon made by the defendant Utah Copper Company from material excavated from said premises,
regardless of whether used to support or brace a
retaining wall, and in so doing can, in the exercise
of reasonable care and caution, disturb the cribbing
erected by the defendant Utah Copper Company to
support said dumps in so far as it may be reasonably necessary to facilitate the mining and removing of the ore and mineral contained in said
dumps or contained in and underneath the surface area of the property described in the findings
of fact herein.
4. That in carrying on mining operations under said lease the plaintiffs. herein, or their successors in interest, are not tO endanger any buildings
or improvements erected or that may hereafter
be erected on said retangular strip of land within
the area of the property so leased (the same being
the strip of land 236 feet in length by 100 feet in
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width, specifically described in the findings of fact
herein) by reason of the sinking or caving of the
surface of said area caused by their mining operations, nor endanger the surface support of any
other buildings or improvements upon any portion
of said property so leased which were situate
thereon at the time of the making of said lease,
to wit, on the 26th day of January, 1916.
5. That the defendant Utah Copper Company
IS not entitled to surface or sub-jacent support for
any buildings or improvements of any kind which
it has erected upon said premises conveyed by said
Stephen Hays to George C. Earl outside of said
area herein referred to as the rectangular strip,
when by protecting such buildings and improvements with surface support would deprive and prevent said Stephen Hays from mining and removing
ores and minerals of commercial value from underneath such buildings and improvements.
6. That the defendant Utah Copper Company
is not entitled to surface or sub-jacent support for
any building or improvements of any kind erected
upon said premises (not included in the area of said
rectangular strip) since the date of said lease from
Stephen Hays to the plaintiffs, to wit, the 26th
day of January, 1916, when by protecting such
buildings and improvements with surface support
therefor would prevent the plaintiffs and their
successors in interest under said lease from min-
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ing and removing ores and minerals of commercial
value from underneath any buildings and improvements so erected since the date of said lease.
7. That the plaintiffs and the defendant
Stephen Hays are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining and restraining the defendant Utah
Copper Company, and its agents, servants and
employes, and all persons acting under it or them,
from in any manner interfering with or molesting
the plaintiffs, or their successors in interest in said
lease, from mining and removing the ores and
minerals in and underneath the surface of said
demised premises, including the ores contained in
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the dumps made by said defendant Utah Copper
Company from material excavated and taken from
said rectangular strip, except in so far as the
mining of ore (other than the ore contained in
said dumps) will endanger, by sinking or caving
of the surface area, any buildings or improvements
erected or hereafter erected upon the said rectangular strip hereinbefore described, or any other
buildings or improvements that were erected upon
said premises outside of said rectangular strip prior
to January 26th, 1916, the date of said lease.
8.

Let judgment be entered accordingly against

the defendant Utah Copper Company and in favor
of the plaintiffs herein and the defendant Stephen
Hays, with costs to plaintiffs.
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Dated this 8th day of November, A. D. 1917.
By the court,
GEO. F. GOODWIN, Judge.
Attest:
THOS. HOMER, Clerk.
By B. F. QUINN,
Deputy Clerk.
(Seal).
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]
DECREE.
This cause having been at issue and having
come on for trial before said court on the 28th
day of June, 1917, and after hearing the evidence
adduced by the respective parties and the argument
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
the court has made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein.
NOW THEREFORE, upon the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the evidence
adduced upon said trial, and on motion of Willard
Hanson, Esq., attorney for the plaintiffs herein,
and Messrs. Booth, Lee, Badger & Rich, attorneys
for the defendant, Stephen Hays, impleaded herein.
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:
That the defendant Stephen Hays is the
owner of all the ores in and underneath the sur1.
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face area of the following described premises situate in the West Mountain Mining District, County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, to wit:
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26,
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees E.
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet,
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9 feet, thence S. 63
degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet; thence N. 25 degrees
4 min E. 61.4 feet; thence S. 63 degrees 26 min.
E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45 min. E.
162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. W. 70
feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet,
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N.
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey,
170 feet more or less to the easterly corner of Lot 62
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min.
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey,
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S.
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 101 feet to the
northeasterly side line o{ Lot 65 of Smith Survey,
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E.
corner of said Lot 65, said lot being identical with
Lot 5, Block 3, Plat "D," Wilkes Official Survey of
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet,
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees
30 min. E., 10.5 feet thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W.
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26;
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. W. along said side line
244 feet more or less to the place of beginning, containing 3.45 acres more or less.
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together with the right to mine and remove such
ores without supporting the surface in its natural
state or otherwise, except only as to the following
rectangular strip being a part or portion of said
premises, to wit:
Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 degrees
30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. corner of the
West half of East half of N. W. quarter of said
Section 26; thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236
feet; thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet;
thence S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence
N. 72 degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to beginning.
In respect to which said strip or portion no mining
operations shall endanger any building or buildings
or improvements erected or to be erected thereon,
by reason of the sinking or caving of the surface
of said area caused by mining operations, and provided that in carrying on said mining operations,
neither plaintiffs nor said Stephen Hays, shall
wantonly or unnecessarily injure or damage any
buildings or improvements erected on said premises
by the defendant, Utah Copper Company.
2. That the plaintiffs herein, as lessees of said
64 defendant Stephen Hays, and their successors in
interest under said lease, have, during the continuance of said lease, the lawful right to mine and remove any and all ores in and underneath the surface area of all of said premises first hereinbefore
described, including the ores contained in the dumps
thereon, without supporting the surface or any
part thereof in its natural state or otherwise, ex-
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cept in respect to the portion thereof hereinbefore
described and referred to as a rectangular strip 236
feet in length by 100 feet in width, in respect to
which said strip or portion the plaintiffs herein,
and their successors in interest, are not to endanger
any buildings or improvements erected or that may
hereafter be erected thereon, by reason of the
sinking or caving of the surface of said area
caused by their mining operations, nor endanger the
surface support of any other buildings or improvements which were situate on any other portion of
said premises at the time of the making of said
lease, to wit, on the 26th day of January, 1916.
3. That the defendant Utah Copper Company,
and its servants, agents and employes, and all persons acting under it or them, are hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from in any
manner interfering with or molesting the plaintiffs,
or their successors in interest under said lease,
from mining and removing the ores and minerals in
and underneath said premises hereinbefore described,
including the ores contained in the dumps made by
said defendant Utah Copper Company from material
excavated and taken from said rectangular strip,
except in so far as the mining of ore (other than
the ore contained in said dumps) will endanger, by
sinking or caving of the surface area, any buildings
or improvements erected or hereafter erected upon
the said rectangular strip hereinbefore described,
or any other buildings or improvements that were

le
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erected upon said premises outside of said rectangular strip prior to January 26th, 1916, the date of
said lease.
4. That the plaintiffs have and recover from
the defendant Utah Copper Company their costs
and disbursements herein, taxed ~at the sum of

$ .............. .
Dated this 8th day of November, A. D. 1917.
By the court,
GEO. F. GOODWIN, Judge.
Attest:
THOS. HOMER, Clerk.
By H. C. McDONOUGH,
Deputy Clerk.
(Seal.)
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]
OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT UTAH
COPPER COMPANY TO FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE AS PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF
HEREIN.
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Filed Nov. 9, 1917.
I.

Defendant objects to all of the proposed finding of fact No. 2 after the first sentence therein,
and submit that the period after the phrase "subject
to the following reservations and provisions," should
be changed to a colon, and that then should follov,
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the language of the reservations in the exact language of the deed, to wit:
"Said grantors hereby reserve to themselves,
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to all
ores in and underneath the surface area hereinbefore
described, together with the right to mine and remove same, provided said mining operations of said
grantors shall not endanger any building or buildings or improvements now or hereafter erected on a
portion of the surface area hereinabove described
by reason of sinking or caving of the surface of
said area caused by said mining operations, said
portion being described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 degrees
30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. corner of the
West half of East half of the N. W. quarter of said
Section 26; thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236
feet; thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet;
thence S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence
N. 72 degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to beginning.
Said grantors also reserve the right to use any
wagon road which may be constructed in the future
by said grantees over the 3.45 acres of ground firstly described herein."
67

And defendant objects to this second finding
as now proposed by plaintiff because it does not accurately and truly state the reservations and provisions of said deed.

II.
Defendant objects to the proposed finding of
fact No. 4 for the reason that there is no evidence
to support the same and it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evedince in this case and contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in this case
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in so far as it finds that the premises were known
to be valuable for ores and particularly copper ore,
as the evidence was that the ore therein was not
commercially workable except when the market
price of copper was above twenty-two cents a pound,
and that at the time of the conveyances in question
the then market price of copper was only about
seventeen cents a pound.
Defendant further objects to said finding No. 4
because there is no evidence that the method generally adopted for mining low grade ore was by
surface mining as proposed.
Defendant further objects specifically to that
part of the proposed finding that surface mining
is carried on by the defendant, Utah Copper Company, at its mine in said district, as carrying a
false inference that all of the mining in said district was done by surface mining, whereas the
evidence showed that some of the mining of the
defendant company and other companies was also
carried on by underground mining.
Defendant also- objects to that portion of the
proposed finding in substance to the effect that
the surface method is the only method by which
such ores can be successfully and profitably mined,
as the evidence showed that while that was the
more economical method, it did not show that it was
the only method or that it could not be successfully
mined by underground method, and on the contrary the evidence showed that much of the ore in
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that ground had been taken out by and through the
working of tunnels.

III.
Defendant objects to the proposed finding No.
5 as being without any evidence to support the same
and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
and contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in the
case, and because said finding fails to distinguish
or differentiate between sub-jacent support of the
ground in its natural state and sub-jacent support
for buildings and structures thereon.
IV.
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 6
because it does not show that the excavation therein mentioned was done for the purpose of constructing and erecting the buildings or houses therein
mentioned.

v.
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 7
because it omits material portions of the lease in
question, and said lease should be set forth in full
in such finding, particularly the provisions thereof
characterizing the premises as a mine and providing
for the timbering of the same and for the extraction
of ore and for the right to use roads on the land.

VI.
Defendant objects. to proposed finding No. 8 in
so far as it recites in substance that the defendant
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company and John Knudson and George C. Earl
wrongfully destroyed or removed the chutes, etc., as
there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to
support that finding and on the contrary by reason
of the absence of evidence with respect thereto, this
action was dismissed as to the said John Knudson
and George C. Earl.

VII.
Defendant objects to the proposed finding of
fact No. 9, in so far as it purports to find that there
was ore in large quantities and of commercial
value, etc., underneath the building therein referred
to, as the only evidence was that there was ore in
a ledge or bluff between said building and the adjoining restricted or rectangular area.

VIII.
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 10
for the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever
to show who were the assignees of the plaintiffs,
lessees, or who are now the legal and equitable
owners of the lease.
IX.
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 11
as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
in this case and contrary to the documentary evi-
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dence in the case and as being without any evidence
in the record to support the same.

X.
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Defendant objects to conclusion of law No. 1,
in so far as it finds the ownership of the ores therein mentioned in the defendant, Stephen Hays, etc.,
on the ground that there is no evidence to support
the same and is contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence in the case and contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in the case, and is contrary to
law.

XI.
Defendant objects to proposed conclusion of
law No. 2 as being without evidence to support tht>
same and contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence in the case and contrary to law and as
failing to distinguish a"nd differentiate between the
right of sub-jacent support of the ground in its
natural state and sub-jacent support for buildings
and structures thereon.
XII.
Defendant objects to the proposed conclusion of
law No. 3 on the ground that there is no evidence to
justify the same and that the same is contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence in the case and
contrary to law.
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XIII.
Defendant makes the same objection to the
proposed conclusion of law No. 4.

XIV.
Defendant objects to the proposed conclusion of
law No. 5, in thart it does not give to the defendant
the right of sub-jacent support for the soil in its
natural state and also on the ground that the same
is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
and is without any evidence to support the same
and is contrary to law, and upon the further ground
that this honorable court specifically ruled in its
decision that the plaintiffs could not wantonly interfere with any such building and they could only do
so to the extent reasonably necessary to exercise
the rights given them by the court's decision.

XV.
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And defendant makes the same objection to
proposed conclusion of law No. 6.

XVI.
Defendant also makes the same objection to proposed conclusion of law No. 7.

XVII.
Defendant also makes the same objection to
proposed conclusion of law No. 8.
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XVIII.
Defendant makes the same objections to the
decree proposed by the plaintiffs as it did to the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
with respect to the matters thereby covered.
Dated this 9th day of October, 1917.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,

Attorneys for Defendant,
Utah Copper Company.
Received copy of the above this 9th day of
October, 1917.
WILLARD HANSON,

P. JONES,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
SHIRLEY

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

NOTI.CE.
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F1iled Nov. 23, 1917.
To the above named defendant, Utah Copper
Company, and to Dickson, Ellis & Lucas, it's attor~
neys:
You and each of you will please take notice thut
his Honor, Judge George F. Goodwin, the trial Judge
of the above entitled court on the 8th day of Novem~
ber, A. D. 1917, duly made and entered Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above
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entitled cause and the same were duly filed on the
9th day of November, A. D. 1917, and a copy of
said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree so made and entered and filed as aforesaid is
herewith served upon you.
WILLARD HANSON,
SHIRLEY P. JONES and
D. B. KIMBALL,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,
Attorneys for impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays,
Copy of the above notice together with Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree received
this 23rd day of November, 1917.
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,
Attorneys for defendant,
Utah Copper Company.

l TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
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Filed Nov. 28, 1917.
Comes now the above named defendant, the
Utah Copper Company, by Dickson, Ellis & Lucas,
its attorneys, and moves the court to vacate and
set aside the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law and the decree heretofore made herein on
the 8th day of November, 1917, and heretofore filed
herein on the 9th day of November, 1917, and to
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grant to this defendant a new trial of this action,
upon the following grounds and for the following
reasons and each of them which materially affect
the substantial rights of this defendant, to wit:
Because on the trial
court erred in overruling the
of this defendant to remove
United States District Court
Utah.
1.
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of this action the
petition and motion
this cause to the
for the District of

2. Because the court erred in overruling
the motion of this defendant to dismiss this
action.
3. Because of errors in law occurring during
the trial and excepted to by this defendant at the
time.
4. Because said findings of fact are contrary
to and against the law.
5. Because said findings of fact are not
sustained by sufficient evidence.
6. Because the evidence in this cause is insufficient to justify the said findings of fact.
7. Because said findings of fact are contrary
to law and to the evidence.
8. Because said conclusions of law are contrary to and against the law.
9. Because said conclusions of law are not
sustained by any sufficient evidence in this cause
and because they are contrary to the law and to
the evidence.
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10. Because said decree is contrary to and
against the law.
11. Because said decree is not sustained by
sufficient evidence and is contrary to the law and
to the evidence in this cause.
12. Because of errors in law occurring at the
trial and excepted to by this defendant at the time
in the rejection of evidence offered by this defendant . ..,
13. Because of errors in law occurring at the
time and excepted to by this defendant at the
time, in that the court refused on the trial to admit
proper and material evidence offered by this defendant and which was illegally withheld against
the demand of this defendant.
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14. Because of errors of law occurring at
the trial and excepted to by this defendant at
the time in that the court admitted on the trial
improper evidence on the part of the plaintiff over
the objection and exception of this defendant.
15. Because of errors in law occurring at the
trial and excepted to by this defendant at the time
in that the court admitted on the trial improper
evidence on the part of Stephen Hays, the impleaded defendant, over the objection and exception of this defendant.
16. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 1 is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
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17. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 2 is contrary to and against the law and
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to the law and to the evidence.
18. Because the court's finding numbered 3
is contrary to and against the law and is not
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary
to law and to the evidence.
19. Because the court's finding numbered 4
is contrary to and against the law and is not
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary
to law and to the evidence.
20. Because the court's finding numbered r
is contrary to and against the law and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to
law and to the evidence.
21. Because the court's finding numbered 6
is contrary to and against the law and is not
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary
to law and to the evidence.
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22. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 7 is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
23. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 8 is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
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24. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 9 is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
25. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 10 is contrary to and against the law and
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
26. Because the court's finding of fact numbered 11 is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
27. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 1 is contrary to and against the law
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to law and to the evidence.
28. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 2 is contrary to and against the law
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to law and to the evidence.
29. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 3 is contrary to and against the law
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to law and to the evidence.
30. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 4 is contrary to and against the law and
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
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31. Because the court's conclusion of law numbered 5 is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
32. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 6 is contrary to and against the law
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to law and to the evidence.
33. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 7 is contrary to and against the law
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is
contrary to law and to the evidence.
34. Because the court's conclusion of law
numbered 8 is contrary to and against the law and
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
35. Because the court erred in entering the
decree herein in favor of the plaintiff and against
this defendant and because the court should have
entered a decree herein in favor of this defendant
and against the plaintiff.
36. Because the court erred in entering the
decree herein in favor of Stephen Hays, the impleaded defendant, and against this defendant, and
because the court should have entered a decree
herein in favor of this defendant and against the
said impleaded defendant.
37. Because the first paragraph of said decree is contrary to and against the law and is not
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sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary
to law and to the evidence.
38. Because the second paragraph of said
decree is contrary to and against the law and is
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law and to the evidence.
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39. Because the third paragraph of said decree is contrary to and against the law and is not
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to
law and to the evidence.
40. Because the fourth paragraph of said decree is contrary to and against the law and is not
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary
to law and to the evidence.
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,

Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Copper Company.
Dated:

November 28, 1917.

Received copy of foregoing Motion for New
Trial and due service admitted this 28th day of
November, 1917.
WILLARD HANSON,

Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Received copy of foregoing Motion for New
Trial this 28th day of November, 1917.
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,

Attorneys for Impleaded Defendant
Stephen Hays.
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

NOTICE.
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Filed Dec. 6, 1917.
To the above named defendant, Utah Copper
Company, a corporation, and to Dickson, Ellis- &
Lucas, its attorneys:
You and each of you will please take notice
that on Saturday, the 15th day of December, A. D.
1917, at the hour of 10 a. m., or as soon thereafter
as counsel can be heard, plaintiff, and the impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, will call up for
argument and disposition before Honorable George
F. Goodwin, one of the judges of the above entitled
court, defendant's motion for new trial herein.
WILLARD HANSON,
SHIRLEY

P. JONES,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

& RICH,
Attorneys for Stephen Hays.

BOOTH, LEE, BADGER

Received copy of the foregoing notice this 5
day of December, A. D. 1917.
& LUCAS,
Attorneys for Defendant Utah
Copper Company, a corporation.
DICKSON, ELLIS

.87
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

ENTERED ORDER.
CASE NUMBER 21157.
DATED DECEMBER 15, 1917.
GEO. F.
GOODWIN, JUDGE.
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Defendant's motion for new trial coming now
on before the court to be heard, Willard Hanson
appearing in behalf of plaintiff and Dickson, Ellis
& Lucas appearing in behalf of defendant. Said
motion is argued to the court by respective attorneys and the court having considered and being
now fully advised in the premises, it is ordered
that said motion be and the same is hereby denied.
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

NOTICE.
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Filed December 17, 1917.
To the above named defendant, Utah Copper
Company and to Dickson, Ellis & Lucas, its attorneys:
You and each of you will please take notice
that on December the 15th, A. D. 1917, in the
above entitled court, defendant's motion for a new
trial was overruled.
WILLARD HANSON,
SHffiLEY

P. JONES,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,

Attorneys for Stephen Hays,
Impleaded Defendant.

'•
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Received copy of the foregoing notice this 15
day of December, 1917.
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,
Attorneys for Defendant, Utah
Copper Company.

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]
NOTICE OF APPEAL.
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Filed May 25, 1918.

To the Clerk of the Above Entitled Court, and to
Messrs. Willard Hanson and Shirley P. Jones,
Attorneys for Plaintiff, and to Messrs. Booth,
Lee, Badger and Rich, Attorneys for Stephen
Hays, Impleaded Defendant:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the abovenamed defendant, the Utah Copper Company, a
corporation, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah from the judgment or d"cree
of the above entitled District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake CoLmty,
State of Utah, entered herein in favor of the above
named plaintiff and the above named impleaded defendant and against the defendant above named,
Utah Copper Company, under date of November
8, 1917, and filed in the office of the clerk of the
84 above entitled court on the 9th day of November,
1917, granting to said plaintiff and impleaded
defendant certain injunctive relief as therein set
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forth, which said judgment or decree became final
on the 15th day of December, 1917, by virtue of the
entry herein on that day of an order overruling
the motion of the defendant Utah Copper Company
for a new trial in the above entitled cause.
Dated this 24th day of May, 1918.
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCA~.

F. ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
L.

Received cop~ of the foregoing notice of appeal
this 24th day of May, 1918.
WILLARD HANSON,

P. JONES,
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondent.
SHIRLEY

BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,

Attorneys for Stephen Hays, Impleaded
Defendant Respondent.

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE.
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I, THOMAS HOMER, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby certify
that the above and foregoing and hereto attached
files contain all the papers filed in this court in
the case of F. L. BYRON, ET AL, vs. UTAH
COPPER COMPANY, a corporation, ET AL, No.
21157, the whole constituting the Judgment Roll.
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I further certify that an undertaking on appeal
in due form has been properly filed and that the
same was filed on the 25th day of May, A. D. 1918.
And I further certify that said Judgment Roll
is by me transmitted to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah pursuant to such appeal.
WITNESS my hand and the Seal of said
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st day of
June, A. D. 1918.
THOS. HOMER,

Clerk Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah.
By HATTIE FINNIGAN,
Deputy Clerk.

[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.]

No. 3240.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR.

Filed June 28, 1918.
Comes now the Utah Copper Company, one
of the above named defendants and in connection
with and as a part of its appeal filed and taken
herein, herewith makes the following assignments
of error which it avers were committed in the
entry and rendition of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and decree in this action and
in the record and proceedings and rulings of the
court had and made prior thereunto, to the grievous
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prejudice of this defendant and appellant the
Utah Copper Company, that is to say:
1. That the court erred in making and entering its finding of fact herein numbered eleven,
to the effect that the impleaded defendant Stephen
Hays is now and ever since prior to the making
of said deed and of said lease has been the owner
of all the ores and minerals in and underneath
the surface area of the property and premises
conveyed by him to the defendant George C. Earl,
and has not sold nor conveyed his said estate,
right, title or interest therein or thereto or otherwise disposed of the same except under said lease
to the plaintiffs herein, for the reason that and
because while the said finding is denominated by
the court as a finding of fact, it is in truth and
in reality a conclusion of law and is not supported
by or justified by the other findings of fact made
by the court herein, but on the contrary is inconsistent with and repugnant to and in conflict with
and unsupported by and overthrown by the other
findings of fact made by the court herein.
2. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered one for
the reason that the same is not supported by the
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
3. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered two for the
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reason that the same is not supported by the
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
4. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered three for
the reason that the same is not supported by the
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
5. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered four for
the reason that the same is not supported by the
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
6. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered five for the
reason that the same is not supported by the findings of fact herein but on the contrary is inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
7. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered six for the
reason that the same is not supported by the findings of fact herein but on the contrary is inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.

.93

8. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered seven for
the reason that the same is not supported by the
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
9. The court erred in making and entering
herein its conclusion of law numbered eight for
the reason that the same is not supported by the
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
10. Because the court erred in making and
entering its decree herein in favor of the plaintiffs and the impleaded defendant against this
defendant in that and because the said decree is
not supported by and on the contrary is in conflict with, repugnant to, inconsistent with and unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
11. The court erred in making and entering
herein the first paragraph of the decree made
and entered herein in that and because the same
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in
conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
12. The court erred in making and entering
herein the second paragraph of the decree made
and entered herein in that and because the same
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in
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conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
13. The court erred in making and entering
herein the third paragraph of the decree made
and entered herein in that and because the same
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in
conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
14. The court erred in making and entering
herein the fourth paragraph of the decree made
and entered herein in that and because the same
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in
conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and
unsupported by the findings of fact herein.
15. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial.
16. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the eighth ground thereof.
17. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the tenth ground thereof.
18. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the eleventh ground thereof.
19. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the twenty-sixth ground thereof.
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20. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the twenty-seventh ground thereof.
21. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the twenty-eighth ground thereof.
22. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the twenty-ninth ground thereof.
23. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirtieth ground thereof.
24. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-first ground thereof.
25. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-second ground thereof.
26. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-third ground thereof.
27. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-fourth ground thereof.
28. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-fifth ground thereof.
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29. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-sixth ground thereof.
30. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-seventh ground thereof.
31. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-eighth ground thereof.
32. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the thirty-ninth ground thereof.
33. The court erred in overruling the motion
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly
with respect to the fortieth ground thereof.
34. The court erred in making and entering
its findings of fact herein for the reason that
and because the complaint herein does not stat(>.
set forth or contain facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against this defendant.
35. The court erred in making and entering
its conclusions of law herein for the reason that
the complaint herein does not state, set forth or
contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendant.
36. The court erred in making and entering
its findings of fact and conclusions of law herein
for the reason that the complaint herein does
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not state, set forth or contain facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against this defendant.
37. The court erred in entering its decree
herein because the complaint herein does not state,
set forth or contain facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against this defendant.
38. The court erred in making and entering
its findings of fact herein because the same arc
not supported by the pleadings herein.
39. The court erred in making and entering
its conclusions of law herein because the same are
not supported by the pleadings herein.
40. The court erred in making and entering
its decree herein because the same is not supported
by the pleadings herein.
41. The court erred m making and entering
its decree herein for the reason that the same
is not supported by the pleadings, findings of fact
and conclusions of law as made by the court.
WHEREFORE this defendant and appellant
respectfully prays that because of the errors above
specified and other errors manifest on the face
of the record, the decree herein may be reversed,
set aside and for naught held and the cause remanded to the court below for such further proceedings and with such further directions as to
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this honorable court may seem meet and proper
in the premises.
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,

F. ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant,
Utab. Copper Company.
L.

Service of the foregoing Assignments of Error
admitted this 28th day of June, 1918.
WILLARD HANSON,
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH,

Attorneys for Respondents.

